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THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND 
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Earl M. Maltz* 
Studies of the federal government's treatment of racial dis-
crimination during the immediate post-Civil War era have dealt 
almost exclusively with problems related to the status of free 
blacks. This focus is in many respects entirely understandable. 
After all, the debate over black rights was a major factor divid-
ing the Republican and Democratic parties, as well as one of the 
central themes of the entire Reconstruction process. Further, 
the adoption of both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and section 
one of the Fourteenth Amendment itself was a direct response 
to the adoption of state laws that sharply curtailed the rights of 
newly-freed slaves. Thus, it should not be surprising that the 
subject has attracted the attention of most students of race rela-
tions, as well as those interested in the period more generally. 
Blacks were not, however, the only racial minority in Amer-
ica during the late nineteenth century. The members of the 
Congress that drafted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Four-
teenth Amendment were also well aware of the presence of an-
other group of nonwhites within the territorial boundaries of the 
United States-Native Americans. 1 Moreover, issues related to 
the status of Native Americans had a profound impact on the 
wording of the citizenship clauses of both enactments. 
This essay will examine that impact in some detail. The es-
say will begin by focusing on the status of Native Americans in 
the antebellum era. It will then follow the drafting process that 
culminated in the definitions of citizenship contained in both the 
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Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, it will 
briefly discuss subsequent developments that resolved the ambi-
guities remaining after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF NATIVE 
AMERICANS PRIOR TO THE CIVIL WAR2 
The problem of defining the status of Native Americans 
created substantial theoretical difficulties for early American le-
gal theorists. The difficulties derived from the fact that Native 
Americans resided on land over which the government of the 
United States claimed authority by right of conquest. Under 
then-accepted principles of international law, inhabitants of con-
quered nations were generally expected to be integrated into the 
polity of the conquerors as citizens. 3 Thus, it might seem to fol-
low that the Native Americans who occupied that land should be 
considered citizens of the United States. 
The problem was that neither the government nor the white 
citizenry of the United States was prepared to accept this conclu-
sion. Native Americans were considered to be members of an 
alien, uncivilized race, whose values were antithetical to those of 
the dominant white civilization. Conversely, many Native 
Americans had no desire to become a part of white society, or to 
be subject to the rules of that society. In a passage that differed 
from other contemporary descriptions of "Indians" only in its 
relatively restrained language, Chief Justice John Marshall aptly 
described the attitude of white Americans toward this issue: 
[T]he tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce sav-
ages, whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was 
drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in possession of 
their country, was to leave the country a wilderness; to govern 
them as a distinct people, was impossible, because they were 
as brave and as high spirited as they were fierce, and were 
ready to repel by arms every attempt on their independence.4 
2. Much of th<: analysis in this section tracks that of James H. Kettner, The Devel· 
opmenc of American Cici~enship. 1608-1870 at 2':11-300 (U. of North Carolina Press, 
1':178). 
3. Em<:r de Yattd, The Lm<' of Nacions, or che Principles of Nawral Law, Book III, 
sec. 201 (George D. Gr<:gory, trans., Oceana Publications, 1758, trans. 1':102, reprinted 
1':164). 
4. Johnson v. Mclmosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 5':10 (1823). The historical devel-
opment of the justifications for the treatment of Native Americans in the antebellum era 
is described in detail in Robert A. Williams, Jr., The American Indian in Wescem Legal 
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Marshall would later provide a theoretical foundation for 
denying American citizenship to Native Americans in Worcester 
v. Georgia.5 In Worcester, he suggested that the Cherokee Indi-
ans possessed a substantial degree of sovereign authority over 
their lands, declaring that the agreements between the federal 
government and the Native Americans "manifestly consider the 
several Indian nations as distinct political communities, having 
territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, 
and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which 
is not only acknowledged, but guarantied by the United States."6 
In Worcester itself, this formulation was protective of Cherokee 
rights; however, it also implied that Native Americans who re-
mained under the authority of tribal governments were citizens 
of those tribes, rather than of the United States as a whole, and 
thus were not even appropriately considered part of the people 
of the United States, let alone citizens. 
While rationalizing the status of Native Americans, Mar-
shall's analysis created other theoretical difficulties. The idea 
that tribal governments had many aspects of true sovereigns 
would seem to imply that the authority of the federal govern-
ments over recognized tribes of Native Americans might be sub-
ject to inconvenient limitations. Thus, Chief Justice Roger 
Brooke Taney seemed to retreat from Marshall's theory in 
United States v. Rogers. 7 Rogers was a challenge to the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts over a murder of one white man by an-
other on the Cherokee reservation. The relevant statute pro-
vided that the federal courts should not have jurisdiction over 
crimes committed by one Native American against another. The 
defendant claimed that he could not be prosecuted because both 
he and the victim had married Cherokee women and been inte-
grated into the Cherokee tribe, and thus should be considered 
Native Americans for jurisdictional purposes. 
Speaking for the Court in rejecting this contention, Taney 
went well beyond a simple interpretation of the statute. Empha-
sizing that Congress could, if it had so chosen, have exercised ju-
risdiction over crimes committed by one Native American 
against another, Taney seemed to reject the proposition that 
Thought (Oxford U. Press. 1990). 
5. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
6. !d. at 557. 
7. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846). 
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tribal government possessed any residual characteristics of sov-
ereignty, declaring that 
[t]he native tribes who were found on this continent at the 
time of its discovery have never been acknowledged or 
treated as independent nations by the European govern-
ments, nor regarded as the owners of the territories they re-
spectively occupied. On the contrary, the whole continent 
was divided and parceled out, and granted by the govern-
ments of Europe as if it had been vacant and occupied land, 
and the Indians continually held to be, and treated as, subject 
to their dominion and control. 8 
Under this analysis, although Native Americans were not 
citizens, they were nonetheless to be considered subjects of the 
government of the United States. On its face, this view was in 
considerable tension with Marshall's assertion of tribal sover-
eignty in Worcester; remarkably, however, Taney did not even 
acknowledge this apparent tension, let alone seek to resolve it. 
Even the dissonance between Worcester and Rogers did not 
fully capture the complexity of the relationship between Native 
Americans and the government of the United States in the ante-
bellum era. Both cases focus on the relationship between the 
federal government and tribal governments, and thus implicitly 
on the status of the Native Americans who were affiliated with 
those tribes. Some Native Americans lived outside tribal com-
munities, attempting to assimilate into white society. The legal 
status of this group was governed by different principles. 
The Articles of Confederation had clearly recognized this 
difference; under the Articles, Congress was granted authority to 
regulate commerce only with those Native Americans who were 
"not members of any state." The drafters of the Constitution 
abandoned this limitation on Congressional power as unneces-
sarily ambiguous; however, the different status of tribal and non-
tribal Native Americans was reflected clearly in the formulation 
of the basis of representation for the House of Representatives. 
The Constitution provides that representation in the House 
is to be apportioned among the states by population. Free alien 
residents were counted fully in the basis of representation; even 
three-fifths of the number of slaves was counted. By contrast, 
"Indians not taxed" -that is, Native Americans who remained 
within the tribal structure-were not to be considered at all in 
8. !d. at 572. 
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determining the number of representatives to which a state was 
entitled.9 By contrast, those who joined white society were 
counted fully in the basis of representation. 
In general, however, even these Native Americans were not 
considered the full political equals of white people. Indeed, Na-
tive Americans who left their tribal communities were not even 
eligible for naturalization under the general naturalization stat-
ute, which allowed only white people to become naturalized citi-
zens.10 Nonetheless, by specific treaty or statute, members of 
some Native American tribes did become naturalized citizens of 
the United States. 
The practice of naturalizing specific tribes of Native Ameri-
cans created potential difficulties for Taney in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford.'' In Dred Scott, Taney concluded that Congress 
lacked authority to naturalize free blacks born in the United 
States, relying on the view that the naturalization power ex-
tended only to those who had not been subject to the jurisdiction 
of the government of the United States at birth. 12 Although dis-
senting on the merits, Justice Benjamin Robbins Curtis took the 
same view of the scope of the naturalization power. 13 If one 
combined this position with Taney's analysis in Rogers, the con-
stitutionality of the practice of tribal naturalization would have 
been called into serious question. 
Taney resolved this difficulty by retreating to Marshall's 
analysis in Worcester. Without even discussing the seemingly 
contrary language in Rogers, he argued that when whites first 
came to America, "[Native Americans] were yet a free and in-
dependent people, associated together in nations or tribes, and 
governed by their own laws" and that "[t]hese Indian Govern-
ments were regarded and treated as foreign Governments, as 
much so as if an ocean had separated the red man from the 
white; and their freedom has constantly been acknowledged, 
from the time of the first emigration to the English colonies to 
the present day." 14 Thus, for naturalization purposes, Taney was 
able to distinguish the position of Native Americans from that of 
native-born free blacks. 
9. U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 2, cl. 3. 
10. Sec, for example, Act of Jan. 29, 1795, 1 Stat. 414,415 (1795). 
11. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
12. Id.at417-18. 
13. !d. at 578 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
14. !d. at 403-04. 
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In the aftermath of Rogers and Dred Scott, the theoretical 
justification for the status of Native Americans was unclear. 
Nonetheless, in practical terms, the parameters of that status 
were widely accepted in the antebellum era. First, Native 
Americans typically did not acquire American citizenship simply 
by virtue of being born within the territorial limits of the United 
States. Moreover, under the terms of the naturalization statutes, 
they were generally ineligible for naturalization. Nonetheless, 
some groups of Native Americans and their descendants ac-
quired citizenship by virtue of treaties and specific statutory au-
thorization. It was against this background that the framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment considered the issue of Native 
American citizenship. 
II. THE ISSUE OF NATIVE AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 
IN THE DRAFTING OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 
A. THE EVOLUTION OF THE REPUBLICAN POSITION ON 
CITIZENSHIP 
The problem of Native American citizenship arose as a by-
product of Republican determination to confer national citizen-
ship on African-Americans born in the United States. The atti 
tude of the Republican party toward this issue underwent a pro-
found transformation during the Civil War and the early Recon-
struction period. During the antebellum era, party members 
were deeply divided on the issue. By contrast, at the time that 
the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, mainstream Republi-
cans almost unanimously embraced the principle that native-
born African-Americans should be viewed as citizens of the 
United States. 
One critical turning point was Attorney General Edward 
Bates' analysis of the status of free blacks in an opinion issued 
on November 29, 1862. 15 In considering whether African-
Americans were citizens within the meaning of a federal statute, 
Bates rejected the state-centered view of citizenship espoused 
prior to the Civil War by leading Republicans such as Abraham 
Lincoln; instead, he declared that national citizenship was solely 
a matter of federal law, and that all citizens of the nation were 
also citizens of the respective states in which they were domi-
15. Citizenship, 10 Op. Att'y Go:n 382 (1862). 
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ciled. 16 Further, Bates concluded that all native-born free blacks 
were citizens of the United States, characterizing the contrary 
conclusion of the majority in Dred Scott v. Sandford as '"dehors 
the record [i.e., dictum],' and of no authority as a judicial deci-
sion."17 
Taken alone, these conclusions might have formed the basis 
for a claim that states were under an obligation to grant free 
blacks a variety of basic rights. However, another prominent 
feature of the opinion was its rejection of the theory that a claim 
to such rights was the sine qua non of citizenship. Bates noted 
that infants and females were considered citizens despite the fact 
that they possessed few if any of the rights normally associated 
with that status; 18 he further observed that even those who were 
sold into involuntary servitude as a punishment for crime re-
tained their citizenship. 19 Thus he declared, "I can hardly com-
prehend the thought of the absolute incompatibility of degrada-
tion and citizenship. "20 Drawing on authorities such as Kent and 
Blackstone, Bates espoused a quite different definition of citi-
zenship: 
In my opinion, the Constitution uses the word citizen only to 
express the political quality of the individual in his relations to 
the nation; to declare that he is a member of the body politic, 
and bound to it by the reciprocal obligation of allegiance on 
the one side and protection on the other. 21 
He explicitly concluded that this right to "protection" was not 
inconsistent with the denial of important rights. 22 Thus, in isola-
tion at least, the practical significance of the Bates opinion was 
quite limited. 
In other respects, however, the opinion was profoundly sig-
nificant. Although Bates' conclusions were not immediately ac-
cepted by all Republicans-as late as 1864, its premises were 
questioned by Republican Senators such as John Henderson of 
Missouri and Peter Van Winkle of West Virginia23 - the Attor-
ney General spoke as the official voice of the Lincoln admini-
16. Sec id. at 388. 
17. !d. at 412. 
18. See id. at 408. 
19. Sec id. at 398-99. 
20. !d. at 398. 
21. !d. at 388. 
22. Sec id. at 398-99, 407-08. 
23. Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Scss. 1459-65 (1864) (Henderson); id. at 1780-81 
(Van Winkle). 
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stration, and thus for the national Republican party itself. 
Moreover, despite the narrowness of the opinion, in symbolic 
terms it recognized free blacks as equal members of American 
society. Thus, in a limited sense at least, it clearly committed the 
Republican party to the principle of racial equality. 
Given racial attitudes in 1862, such a commitment carried 
with it substantial political risks. Republicans were well aware 
of these risks;24 indeed, the issuance of the opinion (three weeks 
after the elections of 1862) was no doubt timed to minimize 
damage to Republican candidates. Nonetheless, given the politi-
cal climate, one might well ask what motivated the Lincoln ad-
ministration to publicly embrace the principle of black citizen-
ship. 
The most plausible explanation is that the opinion was sim-
ply a part of the ongoing effort to discredit Dred Scott. This ef-
fort was critical to the theoretical justification for Lincoln's mili-
tary response to secession. If the majority opinion on the issue 
of slavery in the territories was in fact an authoritative, binding 
interpretation of the Constitution, then secession was a response 
to the refusal by the federal government to recognize the legiti-
mate interests of the slave states-at worst, a rebellion against 
unjust governmental action. This was hardly the background 
against which Republicans sought to prosecute the war effort. 
Of course, in theory Republicans might have focused their 
attacks entirely on the territorial question, simply ignoring 
Taney's treatment of the citizenship issue; indeed, this was the 
approach taken by many antislavery commentators immediately 
after Dred Scott was decided.25 In the public mind, however, the 
two aspects of the decision were linked. Thus, in the words of 
the New York Times, "it was incumbent upon the [Lincoln] Ad-
ministration to purge the Government of all recognition of [the 
doctrines of Dred Scott], on the first fair opportunity."26 
Moreover, Lincoln's prewar response, resting on a state-
centered view of national citizenship, also created theoretical 
difficulties for Union theorists. This view of citizenship was not 
entirely compatible with the position that states had no right to 
leave the Union, and that support for the Confederate cause was 
24. See, for example, Attorney-General Bates on the Dred Scott Decision, N.Y. 
Times 4 (Dec. 17, 1862). 
25. !d. 
26. Sec Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Drcd Scott Case: Its Significance in American 
Law and Politics 417-48 (Oxford U. Press, 1978). 
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treason. Thus, the most palatable solution to the problem was to 
adopt Justice McLean's position in Dred Scott, and argue that all 
native-born free blacks were citizens of the Union. 
In any event, the Bates opinion marked an important stage 
in the evolution of the Republican attitude toward citizenship. 
The next major turning point came in the drafting of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866. 
B. THE CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1866 
As initially proposed by Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois 
on January 5, 1866, section one of the Civil Rights Bill did not 
deal with citizenship at all. Instead, the Bill provided that 
... [t]here shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immuni-
ties among the inhabitants of any state of Territory of the 
United States on account of race, color, or previous condition 
of slavery; but the inhabitants of every race and color, without 
regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary 
servitude ... shall have the same right to make and enforce 
contracts, to sue, to be parties and to give evidence, to inherit, 
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal prop-
erty, and to full and equal benefits of all laws and proceedings 
for the security of persons and property and shall be subject 
to like punishment, pains and penalties, and to none 
other .... 
Congressional power to pass the proposal in this form could 
only be found in the enforcement clause of the Thirteenth 
Amendment. Reliance on this constitutional provision posed 
substantial problems. First, one had to conclude that the Thir-
teenth Amendment went beyond mere dissolution of the mas-
ter/slave relationship and granted Congress the authority to pro-
tect a certain class of rights which were essential to the status of 
freedman. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that this 
position was consistent with the understanding of the drafters of 
the Thirteenth Amendment;27 nonetheless, from the language of 
the amendment, the grant of such power is far from clear. 
Moreover, even if one conceded that the Thirteenth 
Amendment vested power in Congress to protect certain rights, 
27. Sec Earl M. Maltz, Civil Rights, The Constitution, and Congress, 1863-1869 at 
13-28 (U. Press of Kansas, 1990) (discussing the drafting and contemporary understand-
ing of the Thirteenth Amendment). Some aspects of the debate over native American 
citizenship arc discussed in Peter H. Schuck and Rogers M. Smith, Citizenship Without 
Consent: 11/egal Aliens in the American Polity (Yale U. Press, 1985). 
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some of the prohibitions in the Civil Rights Bill might have been 
considered to be beyond that power. Some Republicans believed 
that the section two authority extended only to those rights 
which were essential to the status of a freedman. Put another 
way, if one could be a freedman without a particular right, then 
Congress could not rely on Thirteenth Amendment authority to 
protect that right. Although aliens, for example, were clearly 
not slaves, they had historically been limited in their right to own 
real property and to inherit intestate. Thus, one could be de-
prived of those rights and yet not have the status of a slave.28 
Nonetheless, both rights were protected by Trumbull's proposal. 
To address this problem, even before the Bill was debated 
in the full Senate, Trumbull moved an amendment to provide 
that "all persons of African descent born in the United States 
are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States." Soon 
thereafter, the language was altered to provide that "all persons 
born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power" 
were deemed to be citizens. Trumbull argued that the Naturali-
zation Clause as well as the Thirteenth Amendment gave Con-
gress authority to adopt this provision. He further contended 
that the power to create citizens necessarily implied a power to 
guarantee that those who were naturalized could exercise the 
rights generally associated with citizenship. These rights he de-
fined b¥, reference to judicial decisions interpreting the Comity 
Clause. 9 Other prominent Republicans argued that the Comity 
Clause itself conferred authority on Congress to protect the 
"privileges and immunities" of all citizens. Thus the relationship 
between the citizens of the United States and the federal gov-
ernment became the anchor to which the Civil Rights Bill was 
attached. 
Democrats attacked the citizenship provision, contending 
that blacks should not be made citizens and that, in any event, 
Dred Scott could only be overruled by a constitutional amend-
ment. Republicans generally rejected these arguments. At the 
same time, however, they showed considerable concern about 
the proper limitations on "the inestimable privilege" of Ameri-
can citizenship and the rights appurtenant to that status.30 In any 
event, concerns about the impact of the proposed language on 
the position of Native Americans cut across party lines. 
28. Sec Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Scss. App. 158 (1866). 
29. Cong. Globe 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475,499-500, 600 (1866). 
30. !d. at 527 (remarks of Sen. Ramsey). 
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Both Democratic Senator James Guthrie of Kentucky and 
radical Republican Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan ex-
pressed the fear that Trumbull's proposal would naturalize all 
Native Americans. 31 Trumbull responded that this was not his 
intention. Noting that the Indian tribes were viewed as separate 
nations, Trumbull argued that his proposal would only grant citi-
zenship to those Indians "who are domesticated and pay taxes 
and live in civilized society," and thus had become "incorporated 
into the United States." Nonetheless, he indicated a willingness 
to include a provision dealing specifically with Native American 
citizenship.32 
At this point, Republican Senator Henry Lane of Kansas 
raised the issue of the status of Native Americans who had taken 
individual allotments of land as provided by treaty. While 
Trumbull insisted that these Native Americans were already citi-
zens, Lane disagreed. 33 To resolve any ambiguities, Lane pro-
posed an amendment that would have specifically conferred citi-
zenship on "Indians holding lands in severalty by allotment. "34 
Trumbull objected to this proposal on the ground that some of 
these allotments remained wholly within the jurisdiction of the 
tribal government,35 and the amendment was rejected.36 
Seeking to deal with the same problem, Republican Senator 
Samuel C. Pomeroy of Kansas then proposed to amend the bill 
to exclude "persons ... subject to ... tribal authority" from its 
declaration of citizenship. This language was ambiguous; it was 
unclear whether a person who was born subject to tribal author-
ity and later left his tribe to assimilate into white society would 
become citizen. Taking the view that such a person would not 
become a citizen because he was born subject to tribal authority, 
Democratic Senator Reverdy Johnson of Maryland argued that 
the Pomeroy language would not solve the problem of Native 
Americans who took allotments. 37 
Taking the opposing view on the import of the language, 
Guthrie raised a different objection. Focusing on the potential 
burdens associated with citizenship, he observed that, while im-
migrants seeking naturalization were required to affirmatively 
31. Sec id. at498. 
32. !d. 
33. !d. at 498·99. 
34. !d. at 522. 
35. !d. at 525. 
36. !d. at 526. 
37. !d. 
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evince a desire to become American citizens, as written the Civil 
Rights Act conferred citizenship by operation of law on some 
classes of Native Americans who had not been born citizens. 
Guthrie declared that "I cannot consent to impose citizenship 
and its liabilities and responsibilities upon a people without their 
assent [or the assent of their government ].''3 
Republican Senators John Conness of California and Alex-
ander Ramsey of Minnesota then raised a different objection to 
Pomeroy's formulation. They noted that not all Native Ameri-
cans were associated with a recognizable tribe; some lived on so-
called "public" reservations, while others traveled in small no-
madic groups. Conness and Ramsey pointed out that these non-
aligned Native Americans owed no allegiance to any other gov-
ernment, and would thus become citizens under the Pomeroy 
language. 39 
The existence of this class of Native Americans presented 
Republicans with a conceptual dilemma. As persons who were 
born within the territorial limits of the United States owing no 
allegiance to any other government, they were theoretically enti-
tled to citizenship under the dominant Republican ideology of 
the early Reconstruction era. As Republican Senator John B. 
Henderson observed, to decide otherwise would be to conclude 
that "[the government is] made for the white man and the black 
man, but that the red man shall have no interest in it."40 None-
theless, most Republicans balked at conferring citizenship on a 
group that they viewed as "perhaps the lowest class known [as] 
Indians. "41 Republican Senator George H. Williams of Oregon 
expressed concern over the extent of the rights that might be 
granted to these Native Americans if they were made citizens by 
the proposed Act. He noted that states typically banned sales of 
firearms and alcoholic beverages to Indians, and observed that, 
under the terms of the Bill, states would apparently be powerless 
to enforce such bans against Indians who were granted citizen-
h. 42 s lp. 
This argument bears an almost eerie similarity to Taney's 
warnings against the dangers of black citizenship in Dred Scott.43 
Williams's emphasis on the sale of firearms is particularly strik-
38. !d. 
39. !d. at 526-27. 
40. !d. at 574. 
41. !d. at 526 (remarks of Sen. Conncss); sec also id. at 574 (remarks of Sen. Lane). 
42. Id. at 573. 
43. Sec Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 416-17. 
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ing. One of the common Republican complaints against the 
Black Codes, whose passage had precipitated the Civil Rights 
Bill, was that they often prevented free blacks from obtaining 
firearms. 44 Nonetheless, Williams was apparently in favor of de-
nying to Native Americans what was then viewed as an essential 
tool of self-protection. 
In the face of the Republican objections to the Pomeroy 
language, Trumbull finally retreated to the phraseology used in 
the original Constitution, excluding "Indians not taxed" from the 
definition of citizenship in the Civil Rights Bill.45 Democratic 
Senator Thomas A. Hendricks of Indiana complained that the 
right to citizenship should not depend on whether a person pays 
taxes;46 Trumbull responded that he was in essence using the 
phrase as a term of art, connoting "a class of persons who [are] 
not counted as a part of our people."47 Whatever their reserva-
tions, mainstream Republicans were willing to acquiesce in this 
formulation, and it became law when the Civil Rights Act as a 
whole eventually was passed over the veto of President Andrew 
Johnson. 
C. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
The passage of the Civil Rights Act did not end the contro-
versy over Native American citizenship. Seeking to definitively 
overrule Dred Scott, Republicans proposed to include language 
in the Fourteenth Amendment which declared that "[a]ll persons 
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the State 
wherein they reside." Senator James R. Doolittle of Wiscon-
sin-a nominal Republican who was by this point firmly allied 
with the Democrats- proposed to add language which, like the 
Civil Rights Act, excluded "Indians not taxed" from the defini-
tion of citizenship.48 This language had been adopted by Repub-
licans in section two of the proposed amendment, which rede-
fined the basis of representation in the House of 
Representatives. Nonetheless, clearly having rethought the issue 
carefully, mainstream Republicans unanimously rejected the 
44. See, for example, Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. at 651 (remarks of Rep. 
Grinnell); sec also id. at 474 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull). 
45. Sec id. at 527. 
46. Sec id. 
47. ld.at572. 
48. Id. at 2892-93. 
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idea of incorporating a specific exclusion for Native Americans 
in the section one definition of citizenship. 
Both Lyman Trumbull and Jacob Howard-the floor man-
ager of the Fourteenth Amendment in the Senate-argued that 
the clause as written required Indians to be subject to the "com-
plete" jurisdiction of the United States in order to claim citizen-
ship, and thus excluded Indians who retained allegiance to their 
tribal governments. 49 In addition, Trumbull noted that 
Hendricks's argument on the Civil Rights Act language had con-
vinced him that judges might interpret the "Indians not taxed" 
language literally, thus discriminating between poor Indians and 
rich Indians in determining citizenship status.5° Finally, Howard 
and Republican Senator Daniel Clark noted that the ''Indians 
not taxed" language in essence gave states the authority to de-
cide whether to naturalize or not naturalize Indians through 
their taxing policy-an idea that was fundamentally inconsistent 
with the Republican view that national citizenship should be 
paramount. 51 Thus, the Doolittle amendment was rejected on a 
party line vote,52 and the definition of citizenship was ultimately 
adopted without change. 
Four years later, the Senate Judiciary Committee produced 
a detailed report that specifically addressed the issue of the rela-
tionship _of the Fourteenth Amendment to Native American citi-
zenship.)3 The report ignored Rogers in its review of the legal 
background of the issue; instead, noting the uniform practice of 
dealing with Native American tribes as separate nations and 
characterizing Chief Justice Marshall's anat;'sis in Worcester as 
"the unquestioned law of the court today,"5 the report asserted 
that members of Native American tribes were not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States within the meaning of section 
one: 55 
[I]t is manifest that Congress has never regarded the Indian 
tribes as subject to the municipal jurisdiction of the United 
States. On the contrary, they have uniformly been treated as 
nations . . . . And inasmuch as the Constitution treats Indian 
tribes as belonging to the rank of nations capable of making 
49. !d. at 2893 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull); id. at 2895 (remarks of Sen. Howard). 
50. !d. at 2894. 
51. !d. at 2895. 
52. !d. at 2897. 
53 S. Rep. No. 268. 41st Cong .. 3d Sess. (1870). 
54. !d. at 7. 
55. !d. at 11. 
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treaties, it is evident that an act of Congress which should as-
sume to treat the members of a tribe as subject to the munici-
pal jurisdiction of the United States would be unconstitutional 
and void. 56 
569 
Thus, the report concluded that "the fourteenth amendment to 
the Constitution has no effect whatever upon the status of the 
Indian tribes within the limits of the United States," 57 and that 
members of these tribes were not made citizens by section one. 
The premise on which the Judiciary Committee report was 
based would not long survive. In 1886, the Supreme Court 
would hold in United States v. Kagama that Congress had ple-
nary authority to regulate the internal affairs of Native Ameri-
can tribes. 58 Nonetheless, the report undoubtedly reflected the 
understanding of those who drafted the Fourteenth Amendment 
regarding its impact on tribal Native Americans. 
However, the drafters might have been more troubled by 
the implications of the report for the status of Native Americans 
who were not affiliated with an organized tribe. As noted above, 
many of the drafters were adamantly opposed to conferring citi-
zenship on this class. By contrast, the report strongly suggested 
that "Indians straggling from their tribes" were under the com-
plete jurisdiction of the United States.59 Given the wording of 
the amendment itself, it would thus be difficult to deny that 
these stragglers had become citizens of the United States. 
In any event, this issue was never litigated. The Supreme 
Court was, however, called upon to resolve other ambiguities 
that had been created by the definition of citizenship. 
III. EPILOGUE: FROM ELK V. WILKINS TO THE 
INDIAN NATURALIZATION ACT 
Despite the careful drafting effort of Trumbull and his col-
leagues, some important ambiguities remained in the section one 
definition of citizenship. One such ambiguity involved the status 
of Native Americans who chose not to live on reservations. 
Clearly, a Native American who was born on the reservation and 
remained there was not made a citizen of the United States by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the language did not 
56. IJ. at 9. 
57. IJ. at I. 
58. 118 U.S. 375, 383-3X5 (lXXn) 
59. S. Rep. No. 268 at 10 (citeJ in note 53). 
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clearly establish the status of a Native American who was born 
on a reservation, and then voluntarily severed his ties with his 
tribe and sought to live in white society. 
Elk v. Wilkins60 provided a definitive resolution of this issue. 
Elk arose from the situation of a Native American who had vol-
untarily separated himself from his tribe and then attempted to 
vote in the state of Nebraska. If Elk had become a citizen of the 
United States, the Fifteenth Amendment would have prohibited 
the state from denying him the right to vote on the basis of his 
race; by contrast, if he was not a citizen, the Fifteenth Amend-
ment provided him with no resolution. Thus, the key question in 
the case was whether section one of the Fourteenth Amendment 
automatically made Elk a citizen when he moved off of the res-
ervation and severed his tribal connection. 
Speaking for the majority, Justice Horace Gray concluded 
that Elk was not a citizen, and could therefore constitutionally 
be denied the right to vote in state elections. Gray began with 
the premise that one could only become a citizen by virtue of ei-
ther birth or naturalization.61 At the time of his birth, Elk was 
subject to the jurisdiction of an Indian tribe, which Gray de-
scribed as "an alien, though dependent, power"62 and could 
therefore not claim birthright citizenship in the United States. 
Since Elk had never been naturalized, in Gray's view he failed 
both tests for citizenship-a conclusion Gray supported by ref-
erence to a variety of historical evidence which suggested that 
Indians born subject to tribal jurisdiction could only obtain citi-
zenship through naturalization.63 
In his dissent,64 Justice John Marshall Harlan argued that 
the legislative history of both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 
the Fourteenth Amendment itself suggested that Elk should be 
considered a citizen of the United States.65 He also made a tex-
tual argument, noting that section one by its terms did not re-
quire that persons be "born subject" to the jurisdiction of the 
United States, and that by leaving his tribe, Elk had become sub-
ject to the "complete jurisdiction" of the United States.66 More-
over, Harlan asserted that, because Indian land should be 
60. 112 u.s. 94 (1884). 
61. See id. at 101. 
62. !d. at 102. 
63. Sec id. at 103-09. 
64. Id. at 110-23 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
65. Sec id. at 112-19. 
66. Sec id. at 121. 
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deemed gart of the United States, Elk had been born within the 
country. These two factors led Harlan to the conclusion that 
Elk had satisfied the requirements of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and should therefore be considered an American citizen. 
The decision in Elk clearly limited the significance of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to Native Americans seeking to be-
come citizens of the United States. By contrast, United States v. 
Wong Kim Ark68 pointed in the opposite direction. Wong Kim 
Ark was a man who had been born in the United States to Chi-
nese parents. After visiting China, he was denied the right tore-
enter the United States under the terms of the Chinese Exclu-
sion Act. He argued that the terms of the Act did not apply to 
him because, having been born in the United States, he was a 
citizen of this country.69 
A majority of the Supreme Court agreed, holding that the 
relevant provisions of the Exclusion Act were inapplicable to 
Wong Kim Ark. Speaking for the majority, Justice Horace Gray 
concluded that the language of the Fourteenth Amendment em-
bodied the common law principle that birth within the territorial 
boundaries of a nation conferred citizenship in that nation. 70 
Dissenting, Chief Justice Melville Fuller took a different view, 
focusing on the requirement that the person born in the United 
States must also be "subject to the jurisdiction thereof." 71 Rely-
ing on the Roman principle that a child's citizenship followed 
that of its parents, this argument rested on the contention that a 
child of Chinese parents born in the United States should be 
viewed as subject to the jurisdiction of the Chinese government, 
rather than that of the United States. 72 Language in the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases-dismissed by Gray as dictum-also seemed to 
support this view. 73 
Although formally dealing only with the right of Chinese-
Americans to citizenship, Wong Kim Ark also had important 
implications for the status of Native Americans. Under Elk, a 
Native American could not claim citizenship for himself merely 
by separating from his tribe and assimilating into white society. 
However, Wong Kim Ark gave the children of the Native 
67. Sec id. at 122. 
68. 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
69. Sec id. at 652-53. 
70. Sec id. at 674-94. 
71. Sec id. at 718-30. 
72. Sec id. at 708-09. 
73. 83 U.S. (16 WaiL) 36, 73 (1872). 
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American a constitutional right to citizenship, so long as they 
were born outside the reservation. 
In any event, even before the decision in Wong Kim Ark, 
statutory developments were beginning to reduce the practical 
importance of the Fourteenth Amendment for Native Ameri-
cans seeking citizenship. In 1887, the General Allotments Act 
conferred American citizenship on all Native Americans who ac-
cepted individual allotments of land under the provisions of 
statutes and treaties. Finally, in 1924, Congress eliminated any 
remaining complexities by naturalizing all Native Americans 
born within the territorial limits of the United States. Thus, the 
issue of Native American citizenship was laid to rest once and 
for all. 
CONCLUSION 
One can draw any number of lessons from the Congres-
sional discussions of Native American citizenship in 1866. One 
of the most important, however, is its implications for our under-
standing of the framers' attitude toward citizenship generally. In 
recent years, the idea that citizenship was important to the fram-
ers has been challenged from a number of different quarters. 
Elizabeth Hull, for example, contends that the concept of citi-
zenship "was [not] granted more than a minimal and vague role 
in [the fourteenth] amendment[]."74 Thus, she concludes, even a 
requirement that policymaking state officials be citizens "vests 
citizenship with a significance that is at variance with the lan-
guage and history of the Constitution." 75 While perhaps less ve-
hement than Hull, other commentators have also suggested that 
the distinction between citizens and noncitizens was of little im-
portance in the framers' worldview. 76 
Even a passing review of the discussions of the status of Na-
tive Americans belies any such assertion. The intense struggle to 
draft appropriate language reflects far more than a simple, 
lawyerlike impulse to be precise; it also reveals an acute sense of 
the importance of citizenship, both for symbolic reasons and in 
terms of the rights and obligations appurtenant to that status. 
Admittedly, the discussions cast little additional light on the pre-
cise nature of those rights and obligations; however, they 
74. Elizabeth Hull, Withow Justice For All: The Constiwtional Rights of Aliens 45 
(Greenwood Press. 1985). 
75. !d. at 46. 
76. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 36 (Yale U. Press, 1975). 
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strongly suggest that any effort to reconstruct the worldview of 
the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment must take significant 
account of the distinction between citizens and persons gener-
ally. 
